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Abstract—The process of green building development involves 
not only the symbiotic changes on the numbers of green and 
traditional buildings, but also the game payment of the agents. 
According to the symbiosis theory and evolutionary game 
theory, a symbiosis model of green building supply side is 
established, with the construction market carrying capacity 
considered. The evolutionary stable points and stability 
conditions of the symbiotic evolutionary model are analyzed 
and discussed. The results show that the stable condition of the 
symbiotic evolution between different agents in proposed 
symbiosis model depends upon the combination of the game 
payment of different agents, but has nothing to do with the 
reproduction rate. It is also shown that relaxing the cap on the 
upper limit or maximum volume of the construction market 
will lead to both the numbers of green buildings and the 
numbers of government incentives increase at the same time.
Keywords-green building; density game analysis; symbiosis 
theory; evolutionary game; symbiotic evolution; coexistence; 
equilibrium dynamics; market carrying capacity
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Buildings have significant impacts on the environment, 
accounting for one-quarter of its wood harvest and two-fifths 
of its material and energy flow [5]. In the life cycle of 
buildings, the construction process, the operation stage and 
the disposal procedure, affect carbon gas emissions and 
energy consumption directly and indirectly [23]. Cities and 
urban areas are estimated to use 75% of the world's energy 
and produce up to 80% of its greenhouse gas emissions [13]. 
Green building, as a very important developing direction of 
the construction industry, maximizes resources (e.g. energy, 
land, water, etc.), protects the environment, reduces 
pollution, provides people with healthy, comfortable and 
efficient use of space, and is constructed in harmony with 
nature [20] .
Life cycle thinking on green building has recently gained 
considerable attention, accounting for the three pillars of 
sustainable development: environmental, economic, and 
social aspects [8]. Thatcher and Milner [26] found, 
comparing with traditional building, green buildings enabled 
significant improvements in perceived air quality, significant 
improvements in self-report productivity and significant 
improvement in physical well-being. Currently, more than 
12.4 million square feet of building space in over 150 
countries and territories participate in some form or 
adaptation of the LEED system and 1.85 million square feet 
of building space are certified by LEED per day around the 
world [20]. Green building incentives are categorized into 
external and internal ones. The external incentives are forced 
choice whereby beneficiaries are required to fulfill specified 
conditions or requirements before getting any benefits [19]. 
Although green building has many advantages, it has brought 
many changes, such as extra cost and management change. It 
is regarded that the perceived higher upfront cost by building 
owners and investors is a barrier to a widespread adoption of 
green buildings. However, the experimental analysis from 
Dwaikat and Ali [8] showed that consensus is not reached, 
and more than 90% of the reported green cost premiums 
through empirical investigations fall within a range from 
−0.4% to 21%. The similar result also came from Gabay et 
al.’s work. At the same time, Gabay’s conclusion showed 
that the high rate of return on investment stems mostly from 
savings on electricity and increased worker productivity [9]. 
The social problem related to green building involves many 
aspects such as consumers’ basic understanding, purchase 
intention, social and humanistic needs, public attitudes and 
behaviors, rebound effects and furthermore social acceptance 
[31]. By using ecological modernization (EM) framework, 
Zhou found that the top-down state apparatus is not 
sufficient to overcome the contradictions in green project and 
the profit motives of the property developers [32].
Green building project management is a very 
complicated process. Therefore, critical success factors is 
another important research area which academia should pay 
attention to. Lapinski, Horman, and Riley [15] discovered 
that five key value-added processes contribute to the 
successful delivery of GB projects: deciding to evaluate and 
adopt sustainable objectives at the very early stage of the 
project; identifying and pursuing building features that 
naturally align with sustainability; aligning sustainable 
objectives to the business case of the project; devoting time 
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to align individual team member goals with project goals; 
and selecting an experienced design and construction team at 
the early phase of the project. Research from Azouz and Kim 
[3] showed that the main issues contractors revealed with the 
green building include increased time demand, fear of 
change, increased equipment costs, fear of auditing of 
construction documents and many more. In order to help 
projects achieve higher ratings of Green Mark effectively, Li 
et al. [16] conducted relevant work and identified the critical 
resources and capabilities of design firms. And “experience 
and knowledge in GB”, “organizational green culture”, 
“innovation capability” were found more important than 
other factors in their result. In the ranking of risk importance 
in green building, Qin et al. [20] found the top five key risk 
factors ranked to be: government bureaucracy and 
complicated approval procedures; inadequate GB 
maintenance; lack of GB design experience; lack of 
experienced property management during trial operation 
stage, and inaccurate orientation of project's green-goal. 
Thus, rough set theory and interactive networks were 
employed to investigate the conflict degree amongst various 
project objectives from stakeholder's point of view [25, 29, 
30]. The results revealed that while reputation risk is 
important in China and Australia, the ethical risk of 
‘assessment experience and fairness’ has been highlighted as 
crucial in the Chinese context, the results further show that 
government plays an important role in improving the 
societies' knowledge and awareness on green technology 
uptake in China [30]. 
In order to promote the progress of green building, some 
other management research in this area focus on the policy 
effect [10, 14, 22, 24], developing appropriate constructs to 
benchmark green building attributes [27], the assessing 
system of green building [11, 17, 23], the cost–benefit 
evaluation of energy efficiency technology application 
(EETA) on green buildings [18], “one-stop-shop” BIM for 
green building [28], future Research topics on green building 
project [7]. Despite growing awareness and recognition of 
green buildings, there is a lack of system dynamic studies on 
the symbiosis system between green building developers and 
the government. Out research aims to address and fill this 
gap of knowledge by establishing a theoretical symbiosis 
model that considers the payoff matrix between green 
developers and the government.
II. SYMBIOSIS MODEL ON GREEN BUILDING WITH 
CONSIDERING PAYOFF MATRIX
The basic idea of evolutionary game theory is that payoff 
determines reproductive rate. Successful individuals have a 
higher payoff and produce more offspring. Nevertheless, in 
evolutionary and ecological situations there is not only the 
reproductive rate but also the carrying capacity [21]. The 
density-dependent dynamic system became a very important 
direction in evolutionary research [1, 2, 4]. In order to 
combine the payoff matrix with competitive Lotka-Volterra 
equations, Sebastian presented the density game [21]. 
Further, Huang et al. proposed a stochastic model that 
naturally integrates these two evolutionary ingredients by 
assuming frequency-dependent competition between 
different types in an individual-based model [12]. The 
difference between Sebastian’s model and Huang’s model 
lies in the carrying capacity of individual phenotype.
A. The Basic Assumption of Model
According to the present situation of the construction 
management system, especially when considering the role of 
the construction department in reducing green gas emissions, 
several assumptions are made as the following.
There are two limited rationality agents. One is 
government department which decides whether encourage 
green building projects or not; the other is the developer 
which decided to develop green building projects or ordinary 
construction projects.
Developers can choose to develop green building projects 
or ordinary construction ones. Government departments can 
choose to incent or not.
Information for the agents in the model is incomplete.
Due to the delay characteristics of government approval, 
green building areas implemented by the developer 
themselves are different from those incented by the 
government.
Based on the above assumptions, the payoff matrix is 
shown in Table 1. Government departments can get benefits 
such as completion of the emission reduction targets from F
the development of green building, the corresponding 
incentive cost of green building project is ( as for the , it S S
is further assumed that , . This assumption 0>′S 0<′′S
means that when the government can benefit from the 
development of green building projects. They have the 
motives to provide incentives. The more the government 
benefits, the more rewards will be provided. Normally, in the 
initial stage, developers do not want to develop green 
building projects without incentives from the government 
such as land tax preferential policies or other bonus, in such 
a situation their earnings are and  respectively. P r
According to the national green building standards, the 
incremental cost of green building project is , and the C∆
expected incremental benefit of developer is . According to R
the above mentioned conclusion on green building research, 
the failure probability of green building development is 
assumed , if the green building project fails, the developers f
will loss , is called incremental risk loss. H Hf ∗
Furthermore,assuming that a green building project incentive 
contract signed by the developer and the government 
department, if the developer cannot perform the contract for 
various reasons, and hence will be fined  by the A
government department for breaching the contract. Because 
all items in the payoff matrix do not affect the analysis 
results, so some of them are abbreviated in table 1 for 
analysis. The specific economic meaning of the 
corresponding payments are as follows, means the profit a
per unit area on condition that the developer chooses a green 
building project and government chooses incentives. c
means the incentive cost per unit area in the same condition; 
is the profit per unit area only if the developer chooses a b
green building project and government does not implement 
incentives. is the incentive cost per unit area within the d
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situation that the developer does not choose a green building 
project and the government chooses incentives. Here , ,a b c
and  are required to be positive.d
TABLE I. GAME PAYOFF OF SUPPLY SIDE IN GREEN BUILDINGS 
Government
Incentives Disincentives
Green buildings AHfCSRr ∗−∆−++ SF − AHfCRr ∗−∆−+ F
Developer
Ordinary buildings , ASr −+ PAS ++− Ar P
; ; ;HfCSRra ∗−∆−++= HfCRrb ∗−∆−+= SFc −= SPAd −+=
B. Density Game of Green Building Supply Side 
The government and the developer are both agents with 
limited rationality on the base of limited knowledge and 
ability. According to the two premises and interests of these 
two in the process of green building development, it is 
natural that the main relationship between the government 
and the developer is parasitic symbiosis. If the developer 
disappeared, the government would also cease to incent. But 
without the incentives from the government, the developer 
can also choose to develop green building project. Based on 
the above mentioned analysis and combined the research 
work from Sebastian and Huang, after the carrying capacity 
is introduced, the equation of the density game in [24] 
changes as shown in the equation (1).





































where populations  (abbreviated as ) is the area of ( )tx1 1x
green buildings implemented, populations  (abbreviated ( )tx2
as ) is the area incented by the government which is the 2x
prey for populations  and get its population continuous 1x
growth, if the prey populations is small enough, the predator 
population develop independently, which in turn will lead to 
the prey populations increase again, in turn lead to the 
growth of the predator populations, finally form the cyclical 
behavior process between the two populations. Parameter 1r
represents the net natural increase rate of the development 
behavior of green buildings;  stands for the net natural 2r
increase rate of the incentive behavior from the government. 
Where represents maximum volume of the construction M
market in specific area. Therefore, either the developer or the 
government is facing the same market. The carrying capacity 
can be interpreted as the total market profit when the Ma *
government chooses to incent and the developer selects to 
develop a green building project. The carrying capacity 
can be interpreted as the total incentive cost under the Mc *
same situation. Carrying capacity  and can be Mb * Md *
interpreted by the same way. Parameter and  11xr 22xr
respectively reflect the developing trend of the two agents in 
the green building supply side system, the logistic coefficient 





coefficient because of their consumption of limited social 
resources respectively. 
C. Stability analysis of the model
1) Equilibrium stability analysis of the density game 
model
Equilibrium stability analysis of equation (1) should be 
developed in order to explore the symbiotic evolution 
characteristics of different agents shown in equation (1). 
According to the stability theory of ordinary differential 
equations, the equation (1) have four partial equilibrium, 
which are respectively 
, , ,
( )0,01E ( )0,2 MaE ( )MdE −,03











 has not practical means,  is the equilibrium ( )MdE −,03 4E
point of coexistence of two agents, and is the focus of the 
study. Stability analysis is mainly based on the combined 
symbols of the determinant and trace of Jacobian matrix in 
an ordinary equation. Correspondingly, the Jacobian matrix 
of equation 
 
is shown in the formula .( )1 ( )2



































The corresponding determinant value of the matrix can 
be calculated based on equation (2), the calculation results is 
shown in the formula (3).
TABLE II. EQUILIBRIUM AND STABILITY ANALYSIS ON LAW OF THE JUNGLE MODEL
Equilibrium Jdet trJ Stability conditions
( )0,01E 2*1 rr− 21 rr − Unstable
( )0,2 MaE ( ) cacrr −21 ( ) 12 1 rcar −− ac >
( )MdE −,03 ( ) bdbrr −21 ( ) 21 1 rbdr +− NA
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In the same way, the corresponding trace of the matrix 
can be calculated based on equation (2), the calculation 
results is shown in the formula (4).
   (4)
















The symbiotic evolutionary stable point of different 
agents in supply side system of green building can be 
analyzed according to the equation (2) and (4). Based on the 
stability theory of ordinary differential equations, the 
equilibrium goes into the asymptotic stable state when 
and . The determinant symbol, mark symbol 0>trJ 0det >J
and the analysis of stability conditions of the equilibrium 
point of the supply side density game model on green 
building are shown in table 2. Where  is unstable ( )0,01E
points; is a equilibrium point that represents ( )0,2 MaE
surviving of the investment behavior but extinction of 
government incentive behavior; and is coexistence point 4E
of two agents that is the thesis research priorities. 
Considering the serious green gas emission situation, the 
development of green buildings is an very important measure 
of energy saving and emission reduction for the government, 
and for a long time the incentives for green buildings cannot 
be canceled. Therefore the investment behavior in green 
building is unlikely to become extinct. There will be more 
and more green building areas. It is shown in table 2 that the 
coexistence condition is that , , ( )adbc −sgn ( )ca −sgn
 have the same symbols. But from a practical view, ( )db −sgn
the unit area incentive cost from the government cannot be 
greater than the profit per unit area, so it can be viewed that 
 is positive, and the same to .( )ca −sgn ( )db −sgn
    2) Chart analysis of the density game model
Equation (1) shows that the change of dynamic system is 
mainly determined by the value expression in brackets. 
Therefore, according to the equation (1), the expression of 
equation (6) is shown below.


























It can be seen from the equation (5) that the range of 
agent  and that of agent  are different. And the phase 1x 2x
stability analysis of the point 
 
is shown in Fig. 1. In area4E
, the evolutionary characteristics of the two agents are1D
,  which means that the growth rate of green 0<φ 0>Ψ
buildings 
 
is less than zero and the growth rate of dtdx1
government incentives  is greater than zero. Staring dtdx2
from area , chart point moves up and left, when the chart 1D
point meets the line  which means and , 0=Ψ 0<φ 0=Ψ
then the chart point moves left and into area , Similarly, 2D
when chart point meets the line  which means  0=φ 0>Ψ
and , then the chart point moves up and into area . 0=φ 4D
Starting form this region, the phase point tends to be stable at 












Figure 1. Chart analysis of point 4E
In area , the evolutionary characteristics of the two 2D
agents are ,  that means the growth rate of agent0<φ 0<Ψ
is less than zero and the same to that of agent . dtdx1 dtdx2
Starting from area , the phase point moves down and left, 2D
which tends to be stable at point .When the chart point 4E
meets the line  which means  and , then the 0=Ψ 0<φ 0=Ψ
chart point moves left, which cannot enter area . The 1D
same happens when the chart point meets the line  0=φ
which means  and , then the chart point moves 0<Ψ 0=φ
down and cannot enter area . So, in this area, the chart 3D
point only tends to be stable at point .4E
In area , the evolutionary characteristics of the two 3D
kinds agents are A  which means that the growth 0>φ 0<Ψ
rate of agent  is greater than zero and that of agentdtdx1
is less than zero. Starting from this area, chart point dtdx2
moves down and right, when the chart point meets the line
 that means  and , then the chart point goes 0=Ψ 0<φ 0=Ψ
down and into area . The same, when the chart point 4D
meets the line  which means  and , then the 0=φ 0=φ 0<Ψ
chart point goes left and into area . Starting from this 2D
region, the phase point tends to be stable at  or enters into 4E
area  or area .2D 4D
In area , the evolutionary characteristics of the two 4D
agents are A  which means that the growth rate of 0>φ 0>Ψ
agent  is greater than zero and the same to that of agent dtdx1
. When the chart point meets the line  which dtdx2 0=Ψ
means  and , then the chart point moves left, 0>φ 0=Ψ
which cannot enter area . The same, when the chart point 3D
Huang, Dingxuan & Li, Shuliang. “Density Game Analysis and Evolutionary Equilibrium of Supply Side Symbiosis Behavior of Green 
Building Considering the Market Carrying Capacity”, Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Knowledge Engineering and 
Applications (ICKEA2017), 21st to 23rd October 2017, Imperial College London, UK. IEEE.
meets the line  which means  and , then the 0=φ 0>Ψ 0=φ
chart point moves up and cannot enter area . Starting 1D
from this area, the phase point only tends to be stable at point
, 4E
In summary, only if , ,  ( )adbc −sgn ( )ca −sgn ( )db −sgn
have the same symbols, the symbiotic evolutionary 
equilibrium point is  , the supply side symbiosis system 4E
will be asymptotically stable at the point  regardless 4E
where the initial starting point starts.
III. PARAMETER INFLUENCE ANALYSIS OF MODEL ON 
THE STABILITY POINT
The stability point is the coexistence equilibrium point 4E
of two agents, and the influence of the model parameters on 
the stability point is discussed according equation (1).
Equation (6) to (10) can be found according to the 

































































It can be seen from the formula (6) that increase in the 
maximum volume of construction market accepted by the 
society will lead to the stable point moving right, which 
means the areas of green building increase. Where formula 
(7) shows that the direction of change is determined by the 
sign of , which means an increase in unit area profit ( )db −
will lead to the system stable point moving right, namely the 
area of the green building increases. The contrary conclusion 
can be achieved from formula (9), which means an increase 
in unit area incentive cost will lead to the area decrease of 
the green building. Where formula (8) shows the direction of 
change is determined by the sign of , which hints an ( )ca −
increase in unit area profit without government incentives 
will lead to the system stable point moving left, namely the 
areas of green building decrease; the contrary conclusion cab 
be found from formula , which means that increasing of ( )10
penalties because of developer’s default will lead to an 
increase in the green building area.
In the same way, equation  to  can be ( )11 ( )15
respectively found according to the derivative of the formula 




































































Under the condition that  is stable point, it can be seen 4E
from the formula (11) that increase in the maximum volume 
of construction market accepted by society will lead to the 
stable point moving up, which means the numbers of 
government incentive increase. Where formula (12) shows 
that the direction of change is determined by the sign of
, which means that increase in unit area profit will ( )db −
lead to the system stable point moving up, namely the 
increase of government incentives. The contrary conclusion 
can be achieved from formula (14), which means an increase 
in unit area incentive cost will lead to the government 
incentives decrease. Where formula (13) shows the direction 
of change is determined by the sign of , which hints an ( )ca −
increase in unit area profit without government incentive will 
lead to the system stable point moving down, namely the 
decrease of government incentives; the contrary conclusion 
hints in formula (15), an increase of penalties will lead to an 
increase in the green building area.
IV. CONCLUSION
An evolutionary symbiosis model considering the 
carrying capacity dependent on green building supply side 
are established in this paper. On the basis of our analysis, the 
increase in the maximum volume of the construction market 
accepted by the society will lead to both the areas of green 
buildings and the incentives of the government increase at 
the same time. Payoff dependent and fixed total population is 
the dominant assumption of evolutionary game theory in the 
past decades. But in the ecological and social contexts, this is 
not always right; there are many other factors affecting the 
evolutionary process, such as density limitation. In this 
paper, a simple evolutionary model considered the payoff 
and density limitation have been studied. This extension of 
symbiosis theory seems entirely natural. In particular, it can 
be seen as an implementation of the carrying capacity into 
the symbiosis dynamics. The stochastic and spatial 
evolutionary games considering capacity limitation will be 
investigated in the future work. Here a deterministic, non-
spatial symbiotic system has been explored, and some 
interesting similarities with the traditional replicator equation 
have been found.
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